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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by appellee/plaintiff Machelle Canfield ("Ms. Canfield")
from the trial court's ruling on appellee/defendant Layton City's (the "City") Rule
26(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Jurisdiction
over this appeal is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1)

Issue: Did the trial court properly grant the City's motion to dismiss

where it is undisputed that Ms. Canfield failed to file the required Notice of Claim
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et.
seq (the "Act") and: (1) Ms. Canfield's Complaint, on its face, fails to allege a
contract claim or any type of contractual obligation that might excuse her from the
Act's notice requirements; (2) Ms. Canfield failed to meet her burden of providing
the trial court with evidence of any contractual obligation sufficient to establish
subject matter jurisdiction; and/or (3) Ms. Canfield's claims are grounded in
statute, not contract?
Standard of Review: "Compliance with the [Governmental]
Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter
jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities." Wheeler v. McPherson,
'Ms. Canfield incorrectly states the City's motion is under Rule 12(b)(6).
1

2002 UT 16, f 9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted). Whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v.
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, If 8, 31 P.23d 1147; Housing Auth. of County of Salt
Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 10, 44 P.3d 724.
Preservation of Issue: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction need not
be preserved in the trial court, and may be raised at any time. Horn v. Utah Dep 't
of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah 1998); Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^ 11, 44 P.3d
724; Nielsen v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue,
however, was preserved below in the City's motion to dismiss and supporting
memorandum, in Ms. Canfield's opposition to that motion, and in the trial court's
Order granting the City's motion. See R. 6-8, 9-24,25-27, 28-52, 53-54.
(2)

Issue: Is this lawsuit subject to dismissal on grounds of res judicata

where essentially the same complaint was previously dismissed by the federal
court in Canfieldv. Layton City, Case No. 1:02CV41 (N.D. Utah), based on Ms.
Canfield's failure to comply with the court's order to amend her complaint, which
dismissal is an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(2)(b)?
Standard of Review: Whether claims are barred by res judicata is a
question of law. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f 20, 70 P.3d 1. x

2

Preservation of Issue: Ms. Canfield raised the issue of res judicata in
her opposing memorandum to the City's motion to dismiss, by referring to the
federal court's dismissal of the same Complaint that was subsequently filed in this
lawsuit. See R. 28-35, at R. 30-31. Before the City could file a reply, the trial
court granted the City's motion. The City also would have raised res judicata as
an affirmative defense in its Answer. Regardless, an appellate court can affirm on
any grounds, even one not relied upon by the trial court. Hall v. Utah State Dep V
of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 21, 24 P.3d 958 (citations omitted). All documents
relied on by Layton City for its res judicata defense are part of the public record of
Ms. Canfield's claims and, thus, are subject to judicial notice.2 These public
records are included for the Court's convenience in the Addendum to this brief.
(3)

Issue: Do Utah courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms.

Canfield's claims due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies?

2

A court may take judicial notice of public records and court filings in other
cases. Moore's Federal Practice ^fl2.34[2]. Such records "[are] not viewed as
scrutiny of evidence . . . since facts capable of judicial notice are recorded in
sources whose accuracy is not subject to reasonable question." Id. ^[56.30[3][c],
Thus, even in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of
matters of public records outside the pleadings without converting the 12(b)(6)
motion to one for summary judgment. Id. ^ 56.30[4]. Accord, GFF Corp. v.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997).
3

Standard of Review: Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a
question of law. Beaver County, 2001 UT 81, p , 31 P.23d 1147; Snyder, 2002
UT28,1|l0,44P.3d724.
Preservation of Issue: Issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction
need not be preserved in the trial court, and can be raised at any time. Horn, 962
P.2d at 99; Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724; Nielsen, 888 P.2d at 134.
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules and statutes are determinative of this appeal:
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it
deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation,
conduct and business of the municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815.

(Utah Municipal Code; Rules and Regulations for
Administration of Municipality).

For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to
join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b).

4

Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity,
or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under the color of authority shall file a written notice
of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2).

(Governmental Immunity Act).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by Ms. Canfield in state court on or
about November 25, 2002, Case No. 020700620. The history of Ms. Canfield's
claims is more extensive, however, and includes a November 18, 2002 dismissal
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Utah, of essentially
the same Complaint that is the subject of this lawsuit.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following allegations are taken from Ms. Canfield's Complaint:
Ms. Canfield's claims arise out of her employment by Layton City as a

police dispatcher. R. 1-5. She alleges that a new supervisor in the dispatch area
where she worked "unfairly and unjustly scrutinized [her] work performance" and
her use of sick leave, and that she felt the supervisor's request that she provide
medical documentation was "an improper deviation from existing City policy." R.

5

2-3. She contends that when "officers, employees, agents or servants of [Layton
City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had misused sick leave," she
resigned her employment on June 2, 2001. R. 9; see also R. 21 (Ms. Canfield's
resignation letter).
Ms. Canfield alleges that she resigned because she was confronted with the
"ultimatum" of either resigning or facing termination, and because she feared that
"a termination would preclude her from gaining future gainful employment." R. 4.
She alleges that: (1) other employees "have not been punished as severely as she
has, have not been terminated, or not given an ultimatum, but instead, were given
employee warnings, probation, and other punishment," (2) that her alleged
punishment, including her alleged termination, "was disproportionate to the acts
alleged," and (3) that she "has been treated differently from and more severely
than other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of Defendant's specific
written policy." R. 4-5. She also alleges that "Defendant's personnel policy
specifically requires that plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense alleged." Her Complaint
asks for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial." R. 5.

6

B.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND
PRIOR DISPOSITION
1.

FEDERAL LAWSUIT

The procedural history of this lawsuit begins on or about March 18,2002,
when Ms. Canfield filed an Amended Complaint3 in the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County. See Canfield v. Layton City (Case No. 020800412),
attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 1. This Amended Complaint is word for word
identical to the Complaint filed herein, except that the Complaint here has added \
12.4 Compare id. with Aplt Add., Ex. B.
Layton City removed this initial state lawsuit to federal court and filed an
Answer. See Answer, Case No. 1:02CV00041 (N.D. Utah), attached in Aplee
Add., as Ex. 2. The basis for removal was the City's belief that the Amended
Complaint asserted an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which

3

The original complaint was filed March 14, 2002.

"This added f 12 merely states as follows: "Prior to these incidents, in
December, 2000, after being Plaintiffs supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa
Murdock demanded that Plaintiff provide medical documentation of sick leave
used at that time. Plaintiff did not provide said documentation, although she had
it, because she felt that it was an improper deviation from existing City policy."
The City submits that this additional allegation does not materially alter the
substance or gravamen of her Complaint herefromMs. Canfield's amended
complaint in the federal lawsuit.
7

the federal court would have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See
Notice of Removal, Aplee Add., Ex. 3. Ms. Canfield did not object to removal.
At a subsequent scheduling conference, the Honorable Ronald N. Boyce,
United States Magistrate Judge, commented that it was unclear what claim Ms.
Canfield was asserting. Ms. Canfield's attorney then stated that there was no
equal protection claim, and that Ms. Canfield was asserting a "disparate treatment"
claim under City policies. See Def s Mem. Supp. Mot. Req. Am. Compl.
(Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 4.
Based on Magistrate Judge Boyce's comment, on August 22, 2002, the
Honorable Dale Kimball, United States District Judge, who was presiding over the
federal lawsuit, issued an Order to Show Cause which stated:
The above-entitled matter was removed from state court on
defendant's contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff did not allege such a claim and at
pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiffs counsel asserted there
was no equal protection claim being pursued. Therefore, the case
involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff s rights under
Layton City's civil service standards.
See Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 5. Judge Kimball ordered the parties to
show cause on or before September 28, 2002, why the lawsuit should not be
remanded to state court. See id

8

On August 26, 2002, the City filed a motion to require Ms. Canfield to file
an amended complaint that specifically identified any cause of action which she
was asserting against the City. See Defs' Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002),
Aplee Add., Ex. 6.
Ms. Canfield never responded to the City's motion and she did not file any
amended complaint clarifying the nature of her claims against the City. Instead,
on September 20, 2002, her attorney sent a letter to the City's attorneys providing
them with a "more definitive statement as to what my client's claims are." See
Letter from Brad Smith to Camille N. Johnson, attached as Ex. B to Defs' Resp. to
Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. The letter states that Ms. Canfield is not
asserting an equal protection claim, and that her claim "is one for constructive
termination on the basis that Layton City failed to follow its own termination
policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due process of law." See id.
The letter goes on to state that Ms. Canfiled's claim would "implicate Federal
Fourteenth Amendment case law." Id.
On September 25, 2002, the City filed a response to the Order to Show
Cause, and attached a copy of Mr. Smith's September 20, 2002 letter. See Defs'
Resp. to Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. In this response, the City
referred the court to Mr. Smith's letter and stated that "plaintiffs attorney has
9

identified his client's claim as one for deprivation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." See id., p. 4. Based on
this letter, the City asked the federal court to retain jurisdiction of the lawsuit and
to grant the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend her complaint. Id.
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show
Cause, and never responded or objected to the City's statement to the court that
Ms. Canfield had informed the City that her claim was a due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Ms. Canfield also failed to respond to the City's
motion that she amend her complaint. On October 1, 2002, the federal court
granted the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend her complaint, and
ordered her to do so within 30 days. See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8.
Ms. Canfield did not file a second amended complaint as required by the
federal court's October 1, 2002 Order. Accordingly, on November 15, 2003, the
City filed a motion to dismiss based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the
court's Order. See Motion to Dismiss & Supp. Mem, Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On
November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her
failure to comply with the court's Order. Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10.

10

2.

SUBSEQUENT STATE LAWSUIT

On November 25, 2002, one week after Judge Kimball dismissed her federal
court lawsuit, Ms. Canfield filed her Complaint in this lawsuit. As discussed
above, her Complaint here was virtually identical to her Amended Complaint
which had been dismissed by Judge Kimball.
Layton City did not answer the Complaint and, on December 23, 2002, filed
a Motion to Dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), based on Ms.
Canfield's failure to file a Notice of Claim. R. 6-7, 9-24. On January 17, 2003,
Ms. Canfield filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, where she admitted that
she had not filed a Notice of Claim (R. 30), and contended that her "complaint
alleges a constructive termination and violation of Layton City's written
employment rules including rules regarding the proportionality of employee
discipline, rules relating to consistency among termination, and related matters"
(R. 31). She argued that her Complaint "sounds in contract."5 R. 31. She further
contended that she had employment "with a reasonable expectation of its
continuance" and that "[t]here were various policies and procedures in place for

5

This assertion is, of course, contrary to Ms. Canfield's attorney's prior
representation that his client's complaint claim asserted a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim. See Ex. B to Aplee Add., Ex. 7.
11

termination and discipline.'

R. 32. She cited to the federal lawsuit and

incorrectly asserted that the federal lawsuit was dismissed "on the basis that there
was no federal jurisdiction." R. 30-31. Ms. Canfield did not provide the trial
court with a copy of any "policies and procedures" on which she relied for her
assertion that her claims sounded in "contract," nor did she cite to any specific
City policies or procedures which she claims were breached by the City.7
The City had no opportunity to file a reply memorandum in support of its
Motion to Dismiss because prior to its due date, the state trial court contacted the
City's attorneys and informed them that the court would grant the City's Motion.
On February 19, 2003, the state trial court filed its Order granting the City's
Motion to Dismiss. R. 53-54. On March 12, 2003, Ms. Canfield timely filed a
notice of appeal (R. 56), and this appeal ensued.

6

Ms. Canfield stated in her response that her "prayer for relief includes a
prayer for contract damages with no reference to tort type damages whatsoever."
R. 33. In reality, Ms. Canfield's signed and notarized response to the City's
interrogatories in the federal lawsuit state that she is seeking "general damages for
suffering and humiliation," which are tort damages, not contract damages. See
PL's Resp. to Def s Interrog. No. 3, attached as Ex. 11 in Aplee Add.
7

Attaching evidence to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion does not convert the motion
into one for summary judgment. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, | 5, 987 P.2d 36.
12

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's
lawsuit for the following reasons. First, it is undisputed that Ms. Canfield failed to
file a Notice of Claim pursuant to the Act. Ms. Canfield asserts that she was not
required to comply with the notice requirements of the Act because her Complaint
asserts a contract claim. To the contrary, her Complaint on its face fails to identify
any "contract" or "contractual obligation," much less a breach of any contract.
Ms. Canfield also did not meet her burden below to establish facts sufficient to
show subject matter jurisdiction, because she failed to provide the trial court with
any evidence of a contractual obligation.
Regardless, Ms. Canfield's claims are grounded in statute, not contract,
because they arose out of the Legislature's mandate that municipalities enact rules
and regulations as they "deem best" to govern their operations. The City's internal
discipline and/or termination grievance procedures fall within this statutory grant.
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that public employers
promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to statute and not from contract.
Second, this lawsuit is properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or
claim preclusion because not only are the parties and Complaint the same as those
in the previous federal lawsuit, but the federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's
13

lawsuit, based on her failure to comply with the court's order, constitutes a
dismissal on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Third, dismissal of this lawsuit should be affirmed because this Court and
the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing a grievance or appeal with the City.
VI. ARGUMENT
Ms. Canfield's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
dismissing her lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because her claim
"sounds in contract" and, thus, she was not subject to the notice requirements of
the Act. This argument is without merit for the reasons discussed below.
A.

MS. CANFIELD'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO ASSERT A
"CONTRACT"CLAIM
Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Act,

which applies to claims brought against a governmental entity for money or
damages. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38. Under the Act, a claim against a
political subdivision is barred unless a notice of claim is filed with the governing
body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim arises.8 Id. § 638

The purpose of a notice of claim '"is to require every claimant to clearly
state all of the elements of his claim to the city council'" and to "afford the
political subdivision an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of
recent memory, witnesses are yet available, conditions have not materially
14

30-11 and -13; Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth, 618 P.2d 480,481 (Utah 1980).
Compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is a condition precedent to
maintaining suit {Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT, ^ 23, 24 P.2d
958), and the burden of filing a notice of claim rests entirely with the plaintiff (see
Shunkv. State, 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996)). The requirements of the Act must
be strictly complied with or dismissal of the action is mandated (Hall, 2001 UT
34, f 23, 24 P.3d 958), and failure to comply precisely with notice requirements
deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction (Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001
UT 109,U 16, 24 P.3d 1156).
Based on these standards, the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Canfield's
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Complaint on its face
fails to assert a contract claim. While Ms. Canfield now claims that her
"complaint sounds in contract" and that "[a] contract claim could not be more
clearly stated" (Appellant's Brief at 6), the City begs to differ. A review of the
complaint reveals that the gravamen of Ms. Canfield's claim is that she was
treated differently from other employees. Significantly, the word "contract" never
appears in the Complaint, nor does she allege either the elements of a contract or
changed and to determine if there is liability, and if there is, the extent of it." Hall,
2001 UT 34, \ 23, 24 P.3d 958 (citation omitted); see also Larson v. Park City
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998).
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the elements of a breach of contract claim. Ms. Canfield fails to identify any
specific contract or contractual provision which gives rise to her claim. At most,
the Complaint generally alludes to "City policy" (R. 12), "Defendant's specific
written policy" (R. 4), and "personnel policy" (R. 4). These general references do
not give rise to a contract claim.9 Moreover, in opposing the City's Motion to
Dismiss, Ms. Canfield also failed to provide the trial court with evidence of (or
citation of language from) a "contract," and relied solely on argument.
Second, since "4[s]ubject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the
court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it,"
"4[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever
and however raised.'" Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London,
829 A.2d 801, 806 & 806 n.12 (Conn. 2003) (citation omitted); accord, Bazemore
v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876, 878 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)(citation
omitted). However, as discussed above, Ms. Canfield failed to meet this burden in
opposing the City's motion to dismiss. Ms. Canfield did not refer the Court to, or

Significantly, the City's Policy Manual states that "[t]he policies and
statements contained in this manual and in other statements that may be issued
from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind between the
City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee Add.
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cite, any specific City policy in support of her argument that her claim sounded in
contract. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of the Complaint was proper.10
Third, although Ms. Canfield's explanations of the nature of her claim have
varied, there is no merit to her contention that her claims sound in contract. As a
matter of law, Ms. Canfield's lawsuit is grounded in statute, not contract. Utah
statutory law specifically authorizes municipalities to prescribe rules and
regulations as they "deem best" to efficiently operate the municipality and its
operations:
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it
deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation,
conduct and business of the municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815.
Layton City has adopted such operational policies, including procedures
related to termination and/or discipline of its employees, which accordingly are

10

The Court should disregard Ms. Canfield's criticism of the trial court for
allegedly failing to "engage in a clear, deliberative analysis to categorize, analyze,
and determine governmental immunity claims." Aplt Br., p. 8. She makes this
argument even though she herself failed to raise an alleged "proper analytical
framework" argument in the trial court. See R. 31-36. Even if Ms. Canfieldhad
raised this argument, it is irrelevant because subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time and issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction need not be
preserved in the trial court. See Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11,44 P.3d 724; Nielsen,
888P.2datl34.
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grounded in statute. For example, in Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App.
100, 46 P.3d 247, the trial court ruled there was no contract in a situation where
public employees' were employed pursuant to the County Personnel Management
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15. Id. at f 4 . This Court affirmed, finding
that any alleged rights were statutory, not contractual. Id. atffl[7-9.
In making this ruling, this Court commented that "public employees'
employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from legislative policy,"
(Id. at 18), and cited as persuasive the following statement by the Kansas Supreme
Court regarding the lack of analogy between public and private employees:
"There neither is, not can be, an analogy of statuses between public
employees and private employees, in fact or law, because of the
inherent differences in the employment relationship arising out of the
unique fact that the public employer was established by and is run for
the benefit of all the people and its authority derives not from
contract nor the profit motive inherent in the principle of free private
enterprise, but from the constitution, statutes, civil service rules,
regulations and resolutions."
Id. at f 8 n.7 (quoting Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 881 P.2d 567, 571 (Kan.
1994)) (emphasis in original). As additional support for the contract/statute
distinction, Knight cited Weese v. Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah
1992), as stating that "[t]he county only has those rights and powers granted it by
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the Utah Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to
accomplish them." Id. at \ 8 n.7.
Based on these standards and based on the grant of authority to
municipalities in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any alleged rights of the City's
employees are statutory and not contractual. Accordingly, the Act required Ms.
Canfield to file a notice of claim before bringing this lawsuit.11
Finally, contrary to the assertions in her brief, Ms. Canfield has failed to cite
any Utah case law that would support her "contract" argument. For example, her
citation to Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) is misplaced because
that case deals with a specific Utah statute that states that an action to obtain PIP

u

There is also no merit to Ms. Canfield's argument that the Act should be
liberally construed in her case. Ms. Canfield cites Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 as
support for this argument. However, the Act deals with sovereign immunity, and
not with common law claims, whereas § 68-3-2 addresses common law causes of
action. Moreover, Utah courts have never construed the Act "liberally" {see, e.g.,
Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, \ 11, 40 P.3d 632), and may not accept at face value any
arguments that a plaintiff may make so as to avoid the implications of the Act {see,
e.g., Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996); Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Likewise, Ms. Canfield's
argument regarding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is
also misplaced, because the Complaint on its face makes no such claim.
Regardless, there must be a contract for there to be such an implied covenant and,
as discussed above, the basis for the subject claim is statutory not contractual.
19

benefits is contractual.

Id. at 583. Nor does Farmers New World Life Insurance

Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), support her position. The
"contract" there was a right-of-way agreement entered into by Bountiful City and
Farmers Insurance, which the City did not sign but which it accepted and used,
and for which "valuable consideration" was transferred. Id. 803 P.2d at 1248.
Based on these facts, the court found that the contractual obligation waiver in the
Act applied because a contract had been formed. Id. Significantly, Ms. Canfield
has failed to point to any agreement, acceptance, or consideration, and has not
provided this Court or the trial court with the "contract" on which she relies.13
Similarly, the case law from other jurisdictions cited by Ms. Canfield is
inapplicable. For example, Camas Colorado, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,

12

The basis for plaintiffs claims in Neel was Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309(5) which expressly stated that "If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when
d u e , . . . [t]he person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to
recover the expenses." Neel, 854 P.2d at 583 (quoting statute).
]3

Broadbent v. Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
also fails to support the "contract" argument. The plaintiff there alleged
termination in violation of public policy. Id. at 1276. The court found that this
claim sounded in tort, not contract, and defendant had not waived immunity for
this type of tort claim. Id. at 1277.
20

36 P.3d 135 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), involved a specific written contract between
the County and the plaintiff/contractor.14 Id. at 137.
B.

THIS LAWSUIT IS PROPERLY DISMISSED ON GROUNDS OF
RES JUDICATA.
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court

stated that claim preclusion bars a lawsuit if: (1) the prior and present lawsuit
involve the same parties or their privies, (2) the claim alleged to be barred was
presented in the first lawsuit or could and should have been raised, and (3) the first

14

Other cases cited by Ms. Canfield are also inapposite. See Paquette v.
County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715 (N.C. Ct. App.) (claim for unpaid back wages
for overtime worked); Harris v. State Personnel Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Ct. App.
1985) (mandamus claim for unpaid back wages; employee had exhausted all
administrative remedies); Karpierz v. Easley, 31 S. W.3d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(civil forfeiture case seeking return of monies seized); Garcia v. Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy Dist, 918 P.2d 7 (N.M. 1996) (no discussion of notice of
claim; no evidence that employer's manual stated it was not a contract); Tennyson
v. School Dist. ofMenomenieArea, 606 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (written
policy guaranteed employees they would not be discharged without cause); Koenig
v. City ofS. Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. 1999) (involving third-party
beneficiary to memorandum of understanding between City and Army Corp. of
Engineers); CNXTransp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 325 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
2003) (City admits contract between City and railroad does not sound in tort); J. P.
Asset Co. v. City of Wichita, 70 P.3d 711 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (no discussion of
contract or governmental immunity); Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson,
804 So.2d 1041 (Miss. 2002) (third-party beneficiary of express written contract
between city agency and University of Mississippi Medical Center).
21

lawsuit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 247; see also Maoris &
Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 20, 16 P.3d 1214.15
In this case, each of the three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied.
First, the parties in the prior federal lawsuit are identical to the parties in this
lawsuit. Second, it is obvious that the claim presented in the prior federal lawsuit
is the same claim presented in this lawsuit because the underlying complaints in
the two lawsuits are essentially identical. Third, the dismissal of the prior federal
lawsuit constitutes a final judgment on the merits. Specifically, there was an
adjudication on the merits because the federal lawsuit was dismissed based on Ms.
Canfield's failure to comply with the federal court's Order. See, e.g., Henderson
v. Consolidated Merck Corp., 286 F. Supp. 697, 698 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (dismissal
due to failure to comply with court's order is adjudication on the merits under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41). Accordingly, this lawsuit is barred by res judicata, and is
properly dismissed.
Although Ms. Canfield admits that the federal court dismissed virtually the
same complaint that she filed in this lawsuit, she has mistakenly informed both

15

Significantly, the Court also pointed out that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 41, which is substantially the same as the federal rule, definitively operates
as an adjudication on the merits unless a dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or lack of an indispensable party. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 248.
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this Court and the trial court that the dismissal was for lack of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. See Aplt Br. p. 3.; R. 30-31. However, the record shows that
the federal court dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit because she failed to comply
with the court's direct order that she file a second amended complaint to state her
claim(s) specifically. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, dismissal for
failure to comply with a court order operates as an adjudication on the merits:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to
join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(2)(b).
Filings in the federal district court show that, after the court issued an Order
to Show Cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
Ms. Canfield informed the City's attorneys that her claim was one for due process
and implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Part IV(B)(1) supra, discussing
the federal lawsuit. Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's
Order to Show Cause, never responded or objected when the City submitted to the
federal court the letter in which she admitted that her claim was one for due
process implicating the Fourteenth Amendment, and never responded or objected
23

when the City informed the federal court that Ms. Canfield had stated that her
claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
Significantly, the federal court did not follow through on its Order to Show
Cause by dismissing the lawsuit at that time. Instead, the Federal court retained
jurisdiction of the lawsuit and, on October 1, 2002, it granted the City's motion
requesting that Ms. Canfield be ordered to amend her Complaint, and gave Ms.
Canfield thirty days in which to do so.16 See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8.
Ms. Canfield did not amend her complaint as required by the federal court's
October 1, 2002 Order and, on November 15, 2003, the City filed a motion to
dismiss based on her failure to comply with this court order. See Aplee Add.,
Ex. 9. On November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit
due to her failure to comply with the court's October 1, 2002 Order. See Order,
Aplee Add., Ex. 10.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Canfield's lawsuit was dismissed
due to her failure to comply with the court's order to file a second amended
complaint, and not because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the

16

The federal court's Order was clearly based on the City's response to the
Order to Show Cause wherein it had notified the court of Ms. Canfield's
admission that she was asserting a claim that implicated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's prior lawsuit was a dismissal on the
merits and, as a result, this lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion under the doctrine
of res judicata.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT LACK SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION BECAUSE MS. CANFIELD FAILED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Although Ms. Canfield admitted to the trial court that she resigned her

employment (R. 29),17 she contends in her appellate brief that she was treated
differently than other City employees with regard to sick leave, and was
constructively terminated.18 In light of this contention, this lawsuit should be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Utah law makes clear that courts lack subject matter jurisdiction when a
plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative procedures or remedies. For example, in
l7

The Complaint states that "[bjecause of her fear that a termination would
preclude herfromgaining future gainful employment, Plaintiff reluctantly and
against her will accepted termination." R. 4. In her memorandum opposing the
City's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Canfield stated that she "admits that she resigned
her employment under the circumstances detailed in her complaint." R. 29-30.
18

Based on the allegations in her Complaint, Ms. Canfield was not
constructively terminated. '"If an employee resigns of her own free will, even as a
result of the employer's actions, that employee will not be held to have been
constructively discharged.'" Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 858
(10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
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Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d. 466, the Court dismissed
claims brought by a real estate developer because the developer failed to exhaust
administrative remedies under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Id.ffif14-16.
Patterson recognized that § 10-9-1001 authorizes municipalities to adopt
administrative procedures to govern land use decisions, and that American Fork
City had done so in its Development Code. Id. \ 16. The Utah Supreme Court
accordingly found that the developer's failure to exhaust these procedures resulted
in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. \ 17; see also id. f|[ 18-19 (discussing
failure to exhaust remedies).
In this case, Ms. Canfield has also failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Utah statutory law gives municipalities the authority to prescribe policies and
procedures to govern their efficient operation as the municipalities "deem best/'
so long as the policies and procedures do not conflict with laws of the state. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The City has done so by establishing procedures for
employees to present grievances and object to disciplinary actions, performance
evaluations, and termination, including an appeals process. See Layton City
Policies and Procedures, attached as Ex. 13 to Aplee App.
Although Ms. Canfield contends she was constructively terminated and
treated differently with regard to the City's policies and procedures, she fails to
26

allege that she has been denied access to a grievance/appeals procedure, and
indeed she has not. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Ms. Canfield
ever attempted to avail herself of the City's available grievance/appeals procedure
and, in fact, it is undisputed that she did not do so. In light of the Legislature's
broad grant of authority to municipalities to regulate "operations" as the
municipality "deems best," Ms. Canfield was required to pursue these internal
remedies before bringing a lawsuit.
The fact that the exhaustion requirement applies to internal grievance and
termination procedures of governmental entities is illustrated in numerous cases.
For example, in Long v. Samson, 568 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1997), the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction of contract and tort claims by a professor who was formerly employed
by the University of North Dakota. Id. at 606. In affirming, the court agreed with
the trial court that the professor had failed to exhaust internal administrative
remedies set forth in a Faculty Handbook. Id. at 603-604. As justification for the
exhaustion requirement, the court pointed to the following language in a prior
decision involving a doctor who failed to exhaust administrative remedies at the
hospital where she was employed:
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" . . . an exhaustion of remedies requirement serves the salutary
function of eliminating or mitigating damages. If an organization is
given the opportunity quickly to determine through the operation of
its internal procedures that it has committed error, it may be able to
minimize, and sometimes eliminate, any monetary injury to the
plaintiff by immediately reversing its initial decision and affording
the aggrieved party all membership rights; an individual should not
be permitted to increase damages by foregoing available internal
remedies
Moreover, by insisting upon exhaustion even in these
circumstances, courts accord recognition to the 'expertise' of the
organization's quasi-judicial tribunal, permitting it to adjudicate the
merits of plaintiff s claim in the first instance
Finally, even if the
absence of an internal damage remedy makes ultimate resort to the
courts inevitable ... the prior judicial efficiency will still promote
judicial efficiency by unearthing the relevant evidence and by
providing a record which the court may review."
Id. at 605 (citation omitted). This is consistent with other courts which have held
that an employee must exhaust internal grievance procedures.19
In this case, Ms. Canfield now grounds her claims in the City's "policies
and procedures," but she has failed to allege that she has exhausted the grievance
procedures applicable to those policies and procedures. If Ms. Canfield or Utah
other public employees are permitted to file lawsuits without first exhausting these

19

See, e.g., Bockover v. Perko, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(fired employee of public university laboratory must exhaust internal grievance
procedure before filing lawsuit); Aranoffv. Bryan, 569 A.2d 466, 469-470 (Vt.
1989) (law clerk for state court must exhaust grievance procedure injudicial
branch Personnel Policy before filing lawsuit); Edgren v. Regents of Univ. of Cal,
205 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (dismissal appropriate because architect
employed by state university failed to exhaust internal grievance policies).
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remedies, the judicial system will become inundated with employment-related
claims by public employees, which are more properly dealt with in the first
instance through internal grievance procedures. Thus, the City asks this Court to
find that there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Canfield failed
to exhaust internal remedies that Utah statute authorized the City to adopt.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully submits that the trial
court's dismissal of Ms Canfield's lawsuit should be affirmed.
DATED this O

day of October, 2003.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Judith D. Wolferts
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant
Layton City
N:\13607\520\Appellate Brief TC 10-03-03.wpd
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4.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for an Order Requiring
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 1

Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON k SMITH. P.C.
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden. Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

:

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 020800412
Judge: Glen R. Dawson

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,
Defendant.

Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains
and alleges of Defendant as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION a VEWUE
1.

Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, State of
Utah.

2.

Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in
Davis County, State of Utah.

3.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled
court.

LAYTON CITY ADMIN,

WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 I
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Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for
Defendant, Layton City.

Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had

been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen {13}
years.

During that period of time she was a police

dispatcher.

Approximately six months prior to the

termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock.
5.

Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress
ridden,

6-

On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her
daughter to the doctor's office.

Plaintiff reported said

hours on her time sheet.
7.

Due to the stress situation. Plaintiff decided it was best
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we
could resolve the situation.

Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes

on Monday morning, June llcl\ and he had asked if Plaintiff
should be alright until he got back,

Plaintiff thought she

would.
8-

On Tuesday, the 12th. Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled
for the next day.

10/02
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Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to
be at work-

Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m.

When

Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked
if she needed to leave.

Plaintiff said if she could skip

lunch and go home early it would be better,

Lisa said she

would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief,
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t
lunch.

Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home

early.
10.

In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the
basketball camp that morning-

3 5 T o

(She has had other ankle

iiM
injuries) -

ill!
11.

At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff
she could leave.

Plaintiff was surprised-

Plaintiff was

walking out the door and Lisa said Bhe would need a doctor's
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early.
12.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges,
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject: to any
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever.

Accordingly. Plaintiff

has been treated differently from and more severely than
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of
Defendant's specific written policy.
13.

Officers, employees, agents

or servants of Defendant

WED 12:S3 FAX 801 54B

confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had
misused sick l«ava and gave her an ultimatum that she resign
from the City or face termination.

Because of her fear that

a termination would preclude her from obtaining future
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against
her will accepted termination.
14.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that other employees of City have bean subject to
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or
similar allegations.

15.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges
that eaid individuals have not been punished as severely as
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings,
probation, and other punishment.

16.

Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged.

Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its

termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.

WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as
follows;
1.

For damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

2.

For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy.

3-

For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may
be allowed by law.

4.

For such other and further relief as the court deems
just and proper.

DATED this /£

day of Marcfcu 2002.
Brad C. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah 84067

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 2

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMUXE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
DEFENDANT LAYTON CITY'S
ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Case N a

Judge

Defendant Layton City hereby answers plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows:
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and on that basis denies the
allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint.

3.

The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint are legal

conclusions consisting of allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue, and require no answer. To
the extent paragraph 3 requires an answer, defendant denies each and every allegation.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

Defendant admits that plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for

Layton City and had held that position for more than 13 years at the time of her resignation.
Defendant admits and affirmatively asserts that approximately six months prior to her resignation,
plaintiff was placed under the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. Defendant denies the
remaining allegations of paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint.
5.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint.

6.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that on June 12, 2001, plaintiff left work early informing her supervisor Lisa
Murdock that she was going to take her daughter to the doctor's office. Defendant admits that
plaintiff reported 4.5 hours sick leave for June 12, 2001. Defendant denies the remaining
allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint.
7.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes on June 11, 2001. Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph
7 of the Amended Complaint concerning plaintiffs thoughts and decision and on that basis denies
those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended
Complaint.
8.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that plaintiff left her shift early on June 12, 2001 and that she called in sick to

2

dispatch for the next day. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the
Amended Complaint.
9.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that Lisa Murdock told plaintiff that she needed to come to work on June 13,
2001. Defendant admits that plaintiffs time sheet reflects that she reported to work at 7:00 a.m.
on June 13, 2001. The remaining allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint are vague
and ambiguous and on that basis defendant denies them.
10.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

plaintiffs cell phone calls, and on that basis denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of the
Amended Complaint.
11.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to plaintiffs thoughts
and the other allegations are vague and ambiguous, and on that basis defendant denies the
allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint.
12.

As to the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, defendant admits

that employees of Layton City have used sick leave. Defendant denies the remaining allegations
of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint.
13.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that it confronted plaintiff with her violation of Layton City and Police
Department Policies and that plaintiff resigned her employment. Defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations concerning plaintiffs

3

"fear" and on that basis denies those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of
paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint.
14.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant admits that other City employees have been accused of violating City policy.
Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint.
15.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint.

16.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint,

defendant asserts that its personnel policy speaks for itself and any attempt to characterize it is
denied. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint.
Defendant denies the allegations of that paragraph of the Amended Complaint which
begins "WHEREFORE."
Defendant denies all allegations in the Amended Complaint that relate or are directed to
defendant unless those allegations are expressly admitted in the Answer.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
As separate and distinct affirmative defenses to plaintiffs causes of action against
defendant in the Amended Complaint, defendant alleges as follows:
First Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Second Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs claims as asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations, including, without limitation, §§ 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25(1) and (3), 78-1228, 78-12-29 and 78-12-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
4

Third Affirmative Defense
Defendant is immune and/or this action is barred, in whole or in part, by virtue of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), including,
without limitation, §§ 63-30-3, -4, -5, -10, -11, -13, -15, and -19, and by plaintiffs failure to
comply with the provisions of said Act. In any event, defendant's liability is limited by said Act,
as provided by, inter alia, § 63-30-34, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
Fourth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs claims are not actionable as pled.
Fifth Affirmative Defense
Defendant specifically denies violating any federal or state constitutional, statutory, or
common law right of the plaintiff.
Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a denial of due
process.
Seventh Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any. Plaintiff is thereby barred in whole or
in part from recovering monetary damages from defendant. In addition, or alternatively, any
compensation or benefits received by plaintiff after her resignation, including unemployment
compensation, must be applied to reduce any damages claimed by plaintiff.

5

Eighth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment, and is, therefore, estopped and has
waived any right to bring claims or seek damages or other relief from any defendant, including but
not limited to reinstatement, back pay, or future pay.
Ninth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff waived her rights, if any, to seek damages or other relief from defendant.
Tenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any and all causes of action against defendant.
Eleventh Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from all forms of equitable relief
sought in her Amended Complaint.
Twelfth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of laches from all forms of relief sought in her
Amended Complaint.
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust applicable procedural, administrative, statutory or judicial
remedies otherwise available to her, and this action is therefore barred, in whole or in part.
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense
All acts or omissions of defendant were undertaken in good faith, without malice, with
probable cause, and were fully justified and reasonable under the circumstances.
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Fifteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs actions violated applicable rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and/or
standards of behavior. Any actions of defendant were in response to plaintiffs actions and were
reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
Sixteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, if any, must be established in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. §78-18-1.
Seventeenth Affirmative Defense
As a matter of law, plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages from
defendant.
Eighteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiff must prove her claim for punitive damages by a unanimous verdict, and the
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nineteenth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs punitive damage claims are barred by the prohibition of ex post facto laws in
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, and the Open Courts provision, Article I, Section II
of the Utah Constitution.
Twentieth Affirmative Defense
Defendant did not act with actual malice or reckless indifference, and any award of
punitive damages is barred.

7

Twenty-First Affirmative Defense
The punitive damages claims are barred by the United States Constitution and
amendments thereto, including: Article I, Section 10[1] (Contracts Clause); Fifth Amendment
(Due Process); Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Excessive Fines); and
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection).
Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense
The punitive damages claims are barred by the Constitution of Utah, including Article I,
Section 7 (Due Process), Section 9 (Excessive Fines; Cruel and Unusual Punishment), and
Section 12 (Self-incrimination).
Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendant is entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys5 fees against plaintiff on the grounds that this action, in whole or in part, is brought
without merit and has not been brought or asserted in good faith.
Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense
Defendant is protected by the doctrines of qualified and good faith immunity both at
common and under statutory law.
Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs recovery, if any, is limited by Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-30-22 and -34.
Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs damages, if any, were not caused by an official policy or custom of defendant.

8

Twenty-Seventh Affirmative Defense
Defendant cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment as follows
1

That plaintiff take nothing from defendant by way of her Amended Complaint, and

that the Amended Complaint against defendant be dismissed, with prejudice;
2

That defendant be awarded its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees

incurred herein; and
3

That this Court award such other and further relief as it may deem just

DATED this %

day of April, 2002
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

\M(kNaiiy^

|MjA^

Stanley J. Preston
Camille N. Johnson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City

N \13607\520\Pleaduigs\Answer to Amended Complaint2 wpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 3

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMJLLEN. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF A CIVIL
ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO
FEDERAL COURT

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Case N a

Judge

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 and 1446, defendant Layton City, through its attorneys,
hereby gives NOTICE OF REMOVAL of the civil action pending against it in the Second District
Court of the County of Davis, State of Utah, to this Court. Layton City alleges as grounds for
removal the following:
1.

On March 19, 2002, Layton City was served with a Summons and Amended

Complaint in the civil action titled Machelle Canfield v. Lavton City, a Utah municipality. Civil
No. 020800412, which commenced in the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of
Davis, State of Utah.

2.

The Amended Complaint alleges an equal protection claim under a federal statute,

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3.

This Court has original jurisdiction of the above-entitled action, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and hence, this action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, 1443. Copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint are attached hereto
WHEREFORE, defendant Layton City hereby submits notice that the above-entitled
matter is removed from the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of Davis, State
of Utah, to this Court, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2002.
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU

By \ H ^ A y -

\XrKin

Stanley J. Preston
A
Camille N. Johnson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
N:\13607\520\Pleadings\Removal-FederalCt.wpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 4

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO
FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT THAT STATES
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY

Defendant.
Case No. 1.02-CV-00041 K
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce

Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully
submits this memorandum in support of its motion for an order requiring plaintiff to file a
Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.

RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On March 18, 2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial

District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah.
2.

The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29,

3.

Based upon the Amended Complaint, the City believed that plaintiff was

2002.

attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 8, 2002,
the City removed the action on that basis.
4.

On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff

demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal.
5.

On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report,
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002.
6.

On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial

disclosures on July 12, 2002.
7.

On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document

requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests.
8.

An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During

the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended
-2-

Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim.
9.

On August 22, 2002, the parties were ordered to show cause why this case should

not be remanded to state court.
ARGUMENT
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must, as a threshold matter, determine
questions of jurisdiction. See Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). Based upon
the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that plaintiff was
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City removed
the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial
disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a
question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the
plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal
Protection claim. No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment"
gives rise to equal protection issues.1
The Court has now ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be
remanded to state court. However, based on the vagueness of the Amended Complaint, it is
unclear what cause of action plaintiff is attempting to assert, and whether she has attempted to

J

The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton
City does not have a civil service commission.
-3-

state a claim under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Thus, it cannot be
determined, based upon the current state of the pleadings, whether this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file
a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.
DATED this 2&fa day of August, 2002.
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Weiton J
Camille N.uohnspn
Maralyn M. KSger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\13607\520\Pleadings\DefiniteStatementMem.wpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 5

FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH ' '''' r

22 RUG 02 PM 3= 3 1
CENTRAL DIVISION
DISTRICl OF UTAH

BY:.

DEPUTY CLERK

MACHELLE CANFIELD,

Case No. 02-NC-41 DK

Plaintiff(s),
v.
LAYTON CITY,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Defendant(s)

The above entitled matter was removed from state court on defendant's
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 USC § 1 9 8 3 . The plaintiff
did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiff's
counsel asserted there was no federal equal protection claim being pursued.
Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff's rights under
Layton City's civil service standards. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the parties shall, on or before September 2 8 , 2 0 0 2 ,
show cause w h y this case should not be remanded to state court under 28 USC §
1441(c) and § 1447(c).
DATED this 'QQ- day of August . 2 0 0 2 .
BY THE COURT:

^

Dale Kimball, Judge
United States District Court

£^^y

ce
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
August 23, 2 002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
l:02-cv-00041

and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the
: to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 9 86 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT
84403
Stanley J, Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84145-5000
JFAX 9,3630400

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 6

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO
FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT THAT STATES
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce

Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully
moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states
clearly any cause of action asserted against the City.
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

City removed the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed,
initial disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in
response to a question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time
that the plaintiff was not asserting an Equal Protection claim. The Court has now ordered the
parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court. However, based on the
vagueness of the Complaint, it is now unclear what claim plaintiff is asserting and whether this
Court has jurisdiction over this matter.
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring the plaintiff to
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the
City.
DATED this 2fcft day of August, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanley J. Preston >/
Camille Nv^Johpscm
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N \13607\520\Pleadings\DefiniteStatementMotJon wpd
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 7

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully submits this response to the Court's
Order to Show Cause why this case should not be remanded to state court.
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On March 18,2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial

District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah. A copy of the Amended

Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Amended Complaint does not identify a "cause
of action" or "claim for relief."
2.

The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29,

3.

Based upon the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the City believed that

2002.

plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On
April 8, 2002, the City removed the action on the grounds that this Court had original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
4.

On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff

demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal.
5.

On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report,
signed by plaintiff s attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002.
6.

On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial

disclosures on July 12, 2002.
7.

On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document

requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests.

-2-

8.

An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During

the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended
Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim.
9.

In light of plaintiff s attorney's comments, counsel for the City asked, in writing,

that plaintiffs attorney identify with specificity the plaintiffs claim.
10.

On August 26, 2002, the City filed a Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to

File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against
Layton City.
11.

Plaintiffs attorney has not yet responded to the City's Motion, however he did

respond in writing to the City's request that he identify with specificity his client's claim. Mr.
Smith's September 20, 2002 letter to counsel for the City provides:
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton
City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her
job without due process of law.
I suppose as to the depravation [sic] of due process Federal Fourteenth
Amendment case law would be implicated.
See September 20, 2002 letter attached hereto as Exhibit B.

-3-

ARGUMENT
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
City removed the action on that basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction). Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial disclosures were
made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a question by
Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the plaintiff was
asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal Protection claim.
No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" gives rise to equal
protection issues.1 Now, plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as one for
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Exhibit B. That being the case, this Court has original jurisdiction of the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1331,2 and the case should not be remanded to state court.
The City asks not only that this Court retain jurisdiction of this case, but that it grant the
City's Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to File a Second Amended Complaint that States
Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton City. The vagueness of the Amended

*The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton
City does not have a civil service commission.
2

28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
-4.

Complaint can only be remedied with an amendment which pleads the cause of action plaintiff
now purports to assert.
DATED this £Sfo day of September, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Camille Wtkflinson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\13607\520\Pleadings\ResponseOSC.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Case No. 1:02CV00041, United States
District Court, District of Utah) was served on the parties listed below by first class mail,
postage prepaid, this flo^day of September, 2002.

Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,Utah 84403
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Li^Munter

EXHIBIT A

/02

WED 12:52 FAX 801 646

LAYTON CITY ADMIN.

II

Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C.
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden. Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
m

vs.

m m

i l l1

II-

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 020800412
Judge: Glen R, Dawson

LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality.
Defendant„
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains
and alleges of Defendant as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION a VENUE
1.

Macbelle Caixfield is a resident of Weber County, State of
Utah.

2.

Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in
Davis County, State of Utah.

3.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled
court.

?l/02
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LAYTON CITY ADMIN,

rACTOAL AILBQATIOHfl

4.

Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fox
Defendant, Lay ton City,

Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had

been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13)
years.

During that period of time she was a police

dispatcher.

Approximately six months prior to the

termination of her employment* Plaintiff was placed under
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock5*

Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress
ridden.

1 is

II*

6.

2 §S

On 12 June 2001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and .
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her
daughter to the doctor's office.

Plaintiff reported said

hours on her time sheet.
7.

Due to the stress situation. Plaintiff decided it was best
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we
could resolve the situation.

Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes

on Monday morning, June llcnf and he had asked if Plaintiff
should be alright until he got back.

Plaintiff thought she

would•
8.

On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled
for the next day.

UYTON CITY ADMIN.

WED 12:52 FAX 801 546

$.

icy uva

Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to
be at work.

Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m.

When

Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked
if she needed to leave.

Plaintiff said if she could skip

lunch and go home early it would be better.

Lisa said she

would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief,
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t
lunch-

Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home

early,
10.

In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the
basketball camp that morning.

(She has had other ankle

injuries).
11.

At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff
she could leave.

Plaintiff was surprised.

Plaintiff was

walking out the door and Lisa said Bhe would need a doctor's
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early.
12.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges,
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject to any
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever.

Accordingly* Plaintiff

has been treated differently from and more severely than
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of
Defendant's specific written policy.
13.

Officers, employees, agents

or servants of Defendant

:B3 FAX 801 546 *

LAYTON CITY ADMIN.

confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resign
from the city or face termination.

Because of her fear that

a termination would preclude her from obtaining future
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against
her will accepted termination.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that other employees of City have been subject to
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or
similar allegations.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings,
probation, and other punishment.
Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged>

Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, .including its

termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.

LAYTON CITY ADMIN,

WED 12:53 FAX 801 646

WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as
follows:
1.

For damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

2,

For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy.

3.

For costs of court and attorney's fses as the same may
be allowed by law.

4,

For such other and further relief as the court deems
just and proper.

DATED this

/<?

day of Marcku 2002.
Brad C. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah B4067

EXHIBIT B

STEVENSON & SMITH
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS A N D COUNSELORS AT LAW
3986 W A S H I N G T O N BOULEVARD
H. T H O M A S S T E V E N S O N *
BRAD C. S M I T H
'ADMITTED IN UTAH AND IDAHO

O G D E N , UTAH 84403
TELEPHONE

( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 1 0 OR ( 8 0 1 )
FACSIMILE
(801)399-9954

394-4573

OF

COUNSEL:

D A V I D S. K U N Z

September 20,2002
Camille N. Johnson
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Re:

Machelle Canfield v. Layton City

Dear Camille,
You have requested that I provide you with some sort of more definitive statement as to
what my client's claims are. I thought this was covered while we were in court. However, I will
oblige your request.
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton City
failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due
process of law.
I suppose as to the depravation of due process Federal Fourteenth Amendment case law
would be implicated. However, contrary to the representation you made in your removal
notification I have not and have not intended to assert an equal protection claim arising under 42
U.S.C. §1983. At present I am unaware of any facts which would suggest that Ms. Canfield was
demed equal protection of the law based on any invidious or forbidden group membership. I am
unaware of any evidence that would show that Ms. Canfield was terminated or subjected to a
subjective termination as a result of her gender, age, race, religion, handicap, or national origin.
Accordingly, I do not believe there is any equal protection claim to be made here and have not
intended to make one.
If you have any other questions on this matter please feel free to contact me.
Respectfully,

Brad C. Smith
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FILED
CI.fRK.US DISTRICT COURT

-I OCT02PM 1*56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TMBTWRTRfRfl&JfT^
NORTHERN DIVISION B ^£pUTY CLEM "

MACHIELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K

vs.

ORDER

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to
comply and file an Amended Complaint.
DATED this

/ ~ ( i a v of October, 2002.
BY T H E C O U R T :

SAMUEL ALBA
United States Magistrate Judge

aep
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
October 2, 2002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
l:02-cv-00041

» and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed
:he clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT 84403
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000
EFAX 9,3630400

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 9

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1:02-CV-00041

LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City moves to dismiss the captioned case for plaintiffs failure to
comply with the Court's October 1, 2002 Order which requires plaintiff to file a Second

Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2002. The basis for this Motion is set forth with
more particularity in the accompanying Memorandum.
DATED this [ffr day of November, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

>restor
Camille (N. Johnson
Maralyn IVfReger
Attorneys for Defendant

N \l3607\520\Pleadin»s\Motion to Dismiss wpd
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

Defendant Layton City submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the
captioned case for plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's Order.
On October 1, 2002, this Court signed an Order granting Layton City's Motion to Compel
and ordering plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action
asserted against defendant Layton City. The Court gave plaintiff 30 days in which to comply and
file the Second Amended Complaint. See Order attached as Exhibit "A." Plaintiff has failed to

comply with the Court's Order in that she has not filed a Second Amended Complaint. For her
failure to comply, this case should be dismissed.
DATED this

|5fo day of November, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINE AU

Stanley J. Preston )
Camille N (Johnson
Maralyn M. Reger
Attorneys for Defendant

N \13607\520\Pleadings\Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss wpd
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EXHIBIT A

FILED
CLERK. U S DISTRICT COURT

-I 0CT02PH 1*56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T^B WftJR^lflftl/TAH
NORTHERN DIVISION BY:.

DEPUTY CLERK

MACHIELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K

vs.

ORDER
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to
comply and file an Amended Complaint.
DATED this _/_T<3ay of October, 2002.
BY T H E C O U R T :

SAMUEL ALBA
United States Magistrate Judge

asp
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
October 2, 2002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
*e:

l:02-cv-00041

rrue and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mail
sy the clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, Esq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT 84403
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000
EFAX 9,3630400
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FILED
18 NOV 02 PM ?-U5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D I S T R I O ^ 5 J ^ U ¥ A & UTAH
DEPUTY CI ERK

NORTHERN DIVISION

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
LAYTON CITY,
Case No. 1:02CV41K
Defendant.

On October 1, 2002, this court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff, within thirty days, to
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against Layton
City. As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not complied with the court's Order.
Based upon Plaintiffs failure to comply, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs
case is DISMISSED.

''&£>

DATED this / jl'day of November, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

DALE A.
United States District Judge

&

-

asp
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
November 19, 2002
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * *
l:02-cv-00041

and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or
he clerk to the following:
Brad C. Smith, EBq.
STEVENSON & SMITH
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UT
844 03
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84145-5000
EFAX 9,363 04 00

e-mailed

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 11

Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

vs .
Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
**

a>

Oi

^ o o ~~
C

<D 19 X

oo o

*TI

*-*

a

LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,

Judge: Dale A. Kimball

Defendant.

o

111

Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
Interrogatory No. 1: Identify each person whom you
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the
time of trial of this matter and state the topic or subject
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to
or concern any such testimony.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 1: Plaintiff has not yet
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial,

when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this
interrogatory.

Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may

include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins,
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch;
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch.

The above

named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing# my use of sick
leave, and my job performance.
Interrogatory No, 2: Identify all documents that you
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at
the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 2; Machelle Canfield's Leave
Time Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff Machelle
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as
witnesses at the time of trial, when this determination is made,
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory.
Interrogatory No, 3; Describe with specificity cill damages
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all
information concerning any such damages, including, without
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was

2

calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge.
Answer to Interrogatory No» 3:
Past Wages
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002
unemployed:
at Layton:
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7)
= $20,810.63
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002
IRS
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7)
= $5,628.34
Future Wages
5 July 2002 - 2022
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering
and humiliation.

Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal

to front and back pay for general damages.
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.:
Lt. Quinn Moyes # Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300

3

the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of
your contact with that individual or entity.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 10; See response to Request for
Production of Documents No. 13.
Interrogatory No, 11: If you are aware of the existence of
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or
persons taking the statement, and the name, address and telephone
number of the person now in possession of the original statement.
55 ^

S

Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded.
DATED this

><£
2?

day of

st, 2002
Machelle Canfie
Plaintiff
L

Plaintiff's Address
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah 84067

7

STATE OF UTAH
:SS.

COUNTY OF WEBER

3.

On the
day of
2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally
appeared before me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.
yl&£^

Notary Public

JULIE S.WILLIAMS
863 25TH STREET
OGDEN, UT 84414
My Commission Expires
JUNE 2*,2003

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at Ogden, Utah

8TATI OP UTAH

My Commission Expires

b'-d%-&
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[Subject Area]

[Effective Dale]

Personnel

[Action] New
Revision of #
Previously Effective
[Type] Administrative Policy
Personnel Policy
Finance Policy
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[Distribution] City-Wide
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Form

[Approval Signature & Tide]
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[Pages]
llMs*^

City Manager
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The following personnel policies (3000 and 4000 series) set forth City policies and
procedures for personnel administration, risk management and safety, as well as the
conditions of employment with the City and the basis for compensation and benefits.
The information contained in these policies shall be considered official policy of the Layton
City Corporation arid may be revised from time to time by the City Manager or City
Council with or without notice to the employee. The official interpretation of all matters
dealt with in this manual shall be the responsibility of the City Manager.

The policies and statemenfeiaiiiiai^^
manual and in other statements that may
be issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of anv kind between
the Citv and its employees. Although thev reflect current policy, thev mav. at any time
and for anv reason, with or without notice to employees, be changed or rescinded.

Department Directors may, with the approval of the City Manager, establish additional
policies and procedures as they deem necessary for the efficient and orderly administration
and supervision of their departments, provided that they do not conflict with policies and
procedures established in this manual.

1 of2
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Philosophy of Service
The purpose of the City is to provide those service which the City Council deems
necessary and desirable for the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Layton.
Essentially, all that each City employee does should be for the public benefit and advantage
of the people residing within the corporate limits of Layton City, thus promoting their
greater prosperity and general welfare.
Specifically, the purpose of each department of the City is to provide the highest possible
level of service at the most reasonable cost to the citizens.
gmplpyment PhilosQphy
The quality of the services provided by the City is dependent upon the individual initiative
and responsibility of its employees. Successful employees are self-motivated, perceptive,
problem-solvers, service-oriented, have an eye for detail, and follow a job through to its
completion in a professional manner.
Most work in the City is accomplished on a team basis. A productive and successful
employee is expected to be able to work with others in a cooperative manner to accomplish'
the purpose of the City. The unifying force of team action is communication. To this end,
pertinent job-related information must be shared and communicated with all others in the
City who have an interest or concern in the outcome of any job or endeavor.
The City, therefore, seeks to attract and retain the most highly qualified and competent
employees who exhibit the qualities and characteristics consistent with the job to be
performed.
Enforcement of Policies and Procedures
The Department Director should enforce the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures and
implement all procedures necessary to cany out the responsibilities of their respective
departments consistent with these policies. The Department Director should notify all
departmental employees of these policies and any amendments.

Personnel Administration
The administration of all personnel matters, except those specifically reserved by the City
Council, are the responsibility of the City Manager. The City Manager may delegate these
responsibilities to the Assistant City Manager, The City Manager or Assistant City
Manager, as authorized, shall administer the personnel system provided by this personnel
policy pursuant to approved rules and regulations and applicable law.
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Appeals/Greivances Not Involving Termination or Transfer Discipline
If a Layton City employee wishes to appeal a performance evaluation, disciplinary action, or
register a grievance, the supervisor should instruct the employee in the following procedures:
1. A written notification of appeal must be filed with the Department Director within 5
working days of the interview for the performance evaluation, disciplinary action or
grievance, except as described in Paragraph 7.
In cases involving the appeal of a performance evaluation, this notification should state
the specific reason(s) why the appraisal is being appealed.
2. The Department Director will meet with the supervisor and with the employee separately
to discuss the appeal and obtain relevant information.
3. The Department Director will then determine if the appeal has merit.
4. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does have merit, a meeting will be
held with the employee, the supervisor, the Department Director, and the Personnel
Department to discuss an appropriate resolution to the situation.
5. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does not have merit, the employee
will be informed, in writing, of the Department Director's decision. Written notification
of denial of an appeal will be made within fifteen working days from the time the original
written appeal was filed.
lof5
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6. If the employee wishes to pursue the appeal further, the employee may file a written
notice of appeal with the City Manager within five working days from the time he
received notice that the original appeal was officially denied. The City Manager will
then review the facts of the situation, interview the involved parties, and make a written
determination regarding the appeal within fifteen working days.
7. If an employee's supervisor is a Department Director, the written appeal may be filed
directly with the City Manager within five working days of the interview for the
performance evaluation, disciplinary action or grievance. The Department Director will
then be notified of the appeal and the City Manager will handle the appeal process in
place of the Department Director, as outlined in Numbers 2 through 5 above. The City
Manager's decision on an appeal will be final.
Appeals of Termination or Transfer to a Position of Less Remuneratiop
(See chapter 2.55 of the Lay ton City Municipal Code)
Right of Appeal
No appointive officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 U.C. A. shall be discharged
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his or her politics or religious
beliefs, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body or
heads of departments. In all cases where an appointive officer or regular full time employee,
other than the City Manager and heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a
position with less remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full time employee shall
have the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter.
Appeal Procedure
All administrative appeals shall be processed according to the following procedure:
(1) The appeal shall be taken by filing a written notice of such appeal with the personnel
director within ten days after discharge or transfer. Upon filing of such appeal, the
personnel director shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to said appeal board. Upon
receipt of the referral from the personnel director, the appeal board shall forthwith
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the
matter which relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer,,
(2) The officer or employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented by
counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront any witness whose testimony is to be
considered, to call witnesses, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal
board.
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(3) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee
may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the City Manager whose decision shall be
final.

(4) In the event the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer, then the
supervisor or department head may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the
governing body of the city whose decision shall be final after hearing the evidence in the
same manner as provided for in the appeal to the appeal board.
Appeal Board
There is hereby created an appeal board to consist of five members, two of whom shall be
members of the governing body and three of whom shall be chosen by and from the
appointive officers and employees of the city.
Selection of Board Members
The city recorder will give notice that applications and nominations are being accepted for
the appeal board. Any officer or employee may apply or may nominate another officer or
employee. The city recorder shall establish a reasonable notice procedure and time period
for this process. All people nominated will be notified and given an opportunity to accept
the nomination or withdraw their name from consideration. At the end of the application/nomination period the city recorder shall forward all remaining names to the City
Manager. The members of the appeal board shall be selected through an election which shall
be conducted by the city recorder and which allows all appointive officers and regular full
time employees of the city an opportunity to cast a vote. In addition to the three appointive
officers and regular full time employees elected to the board, alternate members shall also
be elected to serve on the board in the event of an absence or if a conflict of interest should
arise involving another board member.
Election of Board Members
The City Manager shall present the names of five officers or employees to be considered by
the general body of employees of Lay ton City 4o sit on the appeal board. These names shall
be given to the city recorder. After receiving the names, the city recorder shall then prepare
a ballot for the election of said appeal board members. Votes shall be cast, either yes or no,
in favor of each individual nominee by the city employees. If all are affirmed the City
Manager will determine which members are to be the alternates. If any are not affirmed, by
receiving yes votes totaling less than 50% of the votes cast, the City Manager shall present
an additional name or names, in a number equivalent to those not affirmed, for a second
election process. The two board members to be chosen from the governing body shall be
appointed by the mayor.
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Conflict of Interest
No member of the appeal board shall hear an appeal from the department in which the
member is employed or administers. Nor shall a member hear an appeal in which the member
is related to the appealing employee through blood or marriage. For purposes of this section,
related persons shall include and be limited to: father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter,
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brotherin-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law.
Vacancy on the Board
If a vacancy occurs on the board the member shall be replaced by the first alternate board
member in the case of an appointed officer or employee. The City Manager shall then
present a name for the election process. This newest member then becomes the second
alternate.
In the case of a vacancy by a member of the governing body, the mayor shall appoint a
replacement for the remainder of the term.
No Compensation for Board Members
Members of the appeal board shall receive no compensation for services.
Quorum
Three or more members of the appeals board shall constitute a quorum sufficient to hear
appeals.
Board Decisions
The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the
personnel director within fifteen days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board
may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his/her salary for the period of
time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency in salary for the period he was
transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to exceed a fifteen day period. In no
case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal
is taken, except upon a concurrence of the City Manager.
Counting Board Ballots
After balloting, the decision shall be counted, and revealed in the presence of the same
members that voted. A simple majority of quorum voting will determine the decision. A
member may not abstain from voting. The voting shall be limited to upholding or reversing
the decision before the board on appeal.
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Board Reverses Decision and Employee Salary
In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer to a position of
less remuneration, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also
to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall
be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the
recorder of the appeal boards decision, provided that the employee, or officer concerned,
reports for his assigned duties during that next working day.
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